MAJOR CHANGES DURING 2001

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER I

The move to proceed (ilerlemek) into Engineering Manufacture and Development (EM&D) with Lockheed Martin's F-35 marked many milestones (dönüm noktası). The largest combat aircraft programme seen post World War Two. The most all-embracing aerospace programme of its type. But also, the mould(kalıp) was broken with regard to many aspects of industrial co-operation. In effect, the F-35 stands to the F-22 as the F-16 stands to the F-15 - the low cost aircraft that is affordable (güç yetebilir)- and exportable.(ihraç edilebilir) Many countries either built an aerospace industry or kept one going on the back of the F-16. Countries such as Turkey, the European F-16 Users Group (Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway) to name but a few bought F-16, getting assembly lines and often significant(önemli) sub-contract production work.

Well, if Washington adheres(bağlı olmak) to its letter of intent with the JSF, then this is now gone for most customer countries. When the US says that an F-35 will come in at $35-million a copy, this means "An F-35 built at Fort Worth with the sub-contract base established for the US production needs, not diluted(sulandırmak) with foreign suppliers". The UK is about the only exception having to date staked(sınırlamak) over £2-billion as its price to be something like an equal partner, and the price of staying in the game will rise over the next few years. This cost is basically unaffordable for most other nations.

Although some existing F-16 users, such as the Netherlands, are Tier Two observers, it is unlikely that they will ever be able to afford Tier One status. If countries such as this wish to buy JSF, there will be two choices -possibly only one. Option one will be to buy off(teminat ödemek) the Fort Worth production line, and get that all-important $35-million affordable price. Choice two will be to try to get licensed assembly off the US, but at a price that would be unaffordable, if Washington will allow licensed assembly. Has this sunk into many minds as yet? Defence Analysis would say that it has not. Some who might look to play off JSF against Eurofighter and Rafale might yet be disappointed.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER II

That the Pentagon decided not to opt(seçmek) for split(parçalı) procurement(edinim) to allow two complete aircraft design teams to stay in place in the US defence market is also more than noteworthy(dikkate değer). It appears to have been felt that Boeing has more than enough work with the F/A-18E/F and versions thereof(onun) to keep it going for at least a decade, and that with the growth of the UCAV market, this will then take over, keeping another aviation design house alive. But, at face value, this decision does break one of Augustine's Laws which says that the ideal number of airframers in the US market is represented by the equation(denklem) "x=n-1", where "n" is the number today. Strange to tell, once "n" is 2 or less, there are some interesting doctrinal(öğretisel) issues.

US COMPETITION

Although the Pentagon seems willing to see some form of monopoly - short term at least? - in the combat aircraft design and build market, with the sole(tek) source contract awarded to Lockheed Martin, it is less so with shipbuilding. The fact that General Dynamics' bid(önemi) for Litton was opposed by the DoD, and a Northrop Grumman bid was supported and approved shows that there are still some areas where competition is deemed(kabul etmek) necessary. Though many might say that competition would be more desirable(çekici) in the expensive aircraft market rather than the shipbuilding market.

UK NAVAL ORDERS

"Never in so short a space of time has so much been ordered by such a small navy," - OK, a bastardised(değerini düşürmek) version of Winston Churchill's Battle of Britain speech but one which applies well to the UK's 2001 naval orders. Having launched the Type 45 AAW cruiser in 2000, the decision to go firm(şirket) on the second batch(grup), with better pricing and certainty about what could and couldn't be done, was quite amazing. Defence Analysis has spent much time trying to discover whether anyone else - even America - has ever gone contractually(anlaşmalı olarak) firm on so many major naval assets(mal).

The answer, apart from Project Bravo in Taiwan in the late 1980s-early 1990s, is no. The decision to move in this way ought to prove to be one of the greater drivers of cost downwards, if the lessons of the Type 23 frigate are anything to go by. It also ought to put major parts of the UK shipbuilding industry –  in as good a position as needed to contemplate how, when, and if there will be a staged(tmesil etmek) rationalisation(yenileme) of the European shipbuilding industry. Yes, there is still further to go in the UK but in comparison to a country such as, say, France, matters look remarkably healthy.

FINMECCANICA

The Italian holding company has seen a mixed year with respect to its defence fortunes. In effect, the management has a mandate(emir) to sell off or arrange its defence assets so that the Italian state is less bothered(rahatsız etmek) by them. Of course, there will be a few "Do Not Cross" lines with respect to national politics but the brief is broad. 2001 was mixed in that its agreement with Westland over helicopters, Agusta Westland, started full trading and had a good year . Likewise (aynen), the last weeks of the year saw the Alenia Marconi Systems Anglo- Italian electronics company formally come into being. But of the aerospace business?

It had been "certain" that Alenia Aerospace would become part of a new company, the European Military Aerospace Company (EMAC), a joint venture(riskli iş) with EADS. This after Finmeccanica rejected BAES's suit. But by the year's end? All signs say that EMAC in its planned form is a dead duck. A new version might be resurrected(yeniden oluşturmak) but this is unlikely unless Finmeccanica realises that its hand is not as strong as it thought. The price asked of BAES was too great and the British company walked away - EADS seems to have done the same.          A more realistic attitude(davranış) towards such mergers(iki şirketin birleşmesi) - and a realisation that proper(uygun) market values will rarely if ever give Finmeccanica even a third of any identifiable European merger - might help!

 

BOWMAN

Bowman is/was the single largest NATO communications programme for this decade, and possibly for the previous and next decades too. Winning such a deal, for a programme that is about the most integrated(tamamlamak) interlinked and interwoven(birlikte dokumak) communications and command programme, cannot be simply written off - the company that won has pretty much automatically gained a head start on other projects.

Bowman also would seem to confirm GD's position and role as the world's leading land systems company -a profitable(kazançlı) one too - with its positioning from ammunition to high-tech electronics. The loss by Thales is still reverberating (yankılanmak)through that company - how long it will take for the echoes to subside (yatışmak) remains to be seen. Also a good result for ITT, whose VHF radio won the selection too, giving it a heads-up in the market for the future too. Business such as Bowman has to be won, so rare is it - to the winners the spoils.

EADS & AMERICA

2001 marked the start of a concerted(birlikte yapılmış) campaign by French (Thales) and Franco-German (EADS) firms to win major footholds(ayak basacak sağlam yer) in the US defence market. Taken a little aback by the size of BAES's footprint, both continental companies tried hard to create alliances which could rival (rekabet etmek) the British firm. Thales looked to link over ground based air defence with Raytheon, EADS strove(çalışmak) to gain(kazanmak) definitive tie-ups(engelleme) with Northrop Grumman on UAVs. However, the signs in many cases are that although there are some deals on the table these are of a limited nature, and are unlikely to be expanded(gelişmek) in the short or medium terms.

The problems are reported as legion. One is many senior Pentagon players are not worried about what minor defence participants(katılımcı) such as Germany would like to do in the US market. And such parties also have bad moods(aksilik) vis-à-vis(ile karşılaştırılınca) French participation in the US market. Reports say that attempts by senior members of both Thales and EADS to get "access" to relevant Pentagon levels have been rebuffed. The problem as well for European firms is that they are asking for US market access at a time when in many respects, they are closing their domestic markets.

THALES & THE UK

Oh dear, oh dear! How brightly the year started for Thales, as the UK's newest, blondest-haired, bluesteyed boy. The dashing rival to stand up to the incumbent prime contractor of BAES, with a position that other companies could only dream of. To be fair, parts of the year were not at all bad - winning loads of EW work on the Type 45 doesn't hurt, nor does winning work for sensors for the UK's Watchkeeper UAV programme.

But the loss of Bowman, the subsequent(sonraki) further re-organisation and a similar feeling to that of BAES that there was a lack of direction in management abounded. Too many sources say that Thales (France) assumes that of right it must get a certain proportion of work from the UK, and if it doesn't get it then it will choose to close whatever facilities it likes in the UK. This attitude - if it continues - can only hurt Thales by ruining what was a good –arguably(tartışmasız) excellent -playing hand in the UK, while destroying the value of its British investment.

EXPORT MARKETS - NOTABLE BREAKTHROUGHS IN 2001

TIGER

Eurocopter broke its duck with an order - confirmed before year's end - for 22 new export version Tigers, armed with Hellfire missiles rather than the increasingly theoretical Trigat LR weapons. Defence Analysis cannot stress how much this contract is no small saviour(kurtarıcı) for the company, and is also important to the armed helicopter market as a whole. Australia is no pushover(çocuk oyuncağı) customer, and cannot be regarded as being in "Paris's Pocket" - if Canberra has made such a decision (contract signed at the end of December), then it must have had good reasons to do so.

The implications for the wider attack - or simply armed - helicopter market are broad. As a comparison, if the US feels that in a country such as Afghanistan, awash (sürüklenmek) with twin 23mm cannon(büyük top) and hundreds if not thousands of shoulder-launched SAMs, that it can send mere(sırf, sadece) AH-1 Cobras, then what is the problem about buying a Tiger, with its modern vision systems and EW? Australia's opting for Tiger has shown that if a massive armoured(zırhlı) threat is not evident, then why buy a Longbow Apache? Is such a system actually necessary in lesser threat environments? 2002 will see whether Tiger can make ground on that painfully won contest(mücadele) in Australia.

EH101

2001 was the breakthrough year. Although the results were not perfect for EH101, especially the Cormorant Search and Rescue version, victories can be assigned. Arguably, the single greatest win was the SAR and tactical transport contests in Denmark. Denmark is/was a member of the Nordic consortium(konsorsiyom, birlik)) trying to buy a single helicopter to meet all of its varied land and sea requirements. But as it became increasingly evident that this was impossible, then the chances for Cormorant as SAR improved - and the win in Denmark apparently confirms that any existing S-61 operator will want to go for an equivalent-sized(eşdeğer çapta) helicopter.

But winning the troop(grup) transport contest also broke the duck for the EH101, starting to kill the rumour that it is too big for TTH roles. What happens for Norway is now of interest - the SAR model is now being run by the Justice Department which is much less convinced by the merits(değer) of either the NH90 or the S92. Portugal also went for the Cormorant, another good result what with fierce last minute lobbying(değişiklik yapmak) from Sikorsky and S92. Cormorant(karabatak) ultimately won because the air force wanted it, not because beancounters said otherwise, a breakthrough(ani saldırı) for any country!

JAS-39 GRIPEN

The Year of the Gripen would be 2001. Two contracts were won – well, as far as they could be under the circumstances - and one was seemingly guaranteed. The first last. The major South African defence deals of 2000 have been embroiled(karışmak) in Parliament with accusations(şuçlama) of bribery(rüşvet), corruption(kötüleştirme) and so on. But a report in the last quarter of 2001 put to rest all the main allegations, allowing the deal to go ahead, the Gripen's first major such with 28 ordered.

Then Hungary decided to lease 14 (twelve single-seat, two twin-seat) in a deal signed in December worth a few hundred million dollars over a decade starting in 2004. And the de facto collapse of the contest in the Czech Republic - Lockheed Martin, Dassault and Boeing all pulled out because of contractual(sözleşmeli) issues which were deemed(zannetmek) way too arduous(güç) - left the field clear for single source negotiations between Prague and BAES/Saab for up to a few dozen aircraft.

It cannot be over-stressed how important these deals are, showing that the JAS-39 Gripen can win not just in one country but several. Dare one say that after two major Central European wins, that countries such as Poland - which was seen as a shoo-in for US offerings but which held back from an actual order - might see advantages in creating a Central European Gripen User Group, pooling (birleştirmek) maintenance and training?

Might one also think that, as a humorous aside, that Vienna might like to recreate the Austro-Hungarian Air Force by selecting the JAS-39 if it goes ahead with an order in late 2002-early 2003? Chuck in Slovenia too, possibly even Switzerland, for a recce bird, and JAS-39 could fulfil the dream (mission?) of becoming the next-generation F-16. Whatever, 2001 was an excellent year for the aircraft and its marketing team.

LAFAYETTE

Another win for the pretty but often unfancied(sıradan) French runner. Whatever its technical merits, it satisfied the Singapore Navy enough to see that service order six in a slightly smaller version than is the norm for its new air defence frigate(fırkateyn) programme. Although the weapons fit is not fully decided – and there may be yet problems with fitting US weapons to a French platform - the programme looks set to proceed(ilerlemek). The Lafayette design has shown itself to be favoured by many around the world, not least in Saudi Arabia and Taiwan, and has given the German Meko design a serious run for its money. Might we see further such sales in 2002?